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Faith and Martyrdom: The Tragedy of
Aaron Swartz
Austin C. Murnane*
“[A]nd if you will not tell of his martyrdom, tell at
least of his faith.”
-Oscar Wilde, The Portrait of Mr. W. H. (1889)
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INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 2013, Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman found her
partner, Aaron Swartz, hanging in the couple’s apartment in
Brooklyn, New York.1 Swartz had committed suicide.2 He was 26
years old.3
*
J.D., 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2006, United States Naval
Academy. The Author would like to thank the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal staff, especially Tiffany Mahmood, for their hard work and
patience throughout the editorial process.
1
See, e.g., John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26,
Apparently a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/
technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html?_r=0;
Michael
Martinez,
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At the age of 14, Swartz had coauthored the programming
language specification that came to be known as Rich Site
Summary (RSS) 1.0.4 He also formed his own company, which
merged with the news service Reddit, and co-founded the
advocacy organization Demand Progress.5 Despite dropping out of
college after deciding that Stanford lacked the intellectual rigor he
craved, he earned a position as a fellow at Harvard University’s
Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics.6 But at the time of his death,
Swartz was also under federal indictment for wire fraud, computer
fraud, unlawfully obtaining information from a protected
computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer.7
“He was killed by the government,” said Swartz’s father,
Robert Swartz, at Swartz’s funeral.8 This was one of many
accusations leveled against the United States Attorney’s Office
(USAO) for the District of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts
USAO had indicted Swartz for hacking into the non-profit
academic journal service JSTOR using an internet connection at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT” or “the
Institute”).9 At a memorial service for Swartz in March 2013,

Internet Prodigy, Activist Aaron Swartz Commits Suicide, CNN (Mar. 7, 2013, 11:41
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/12/us/new-york-reddit-founder-suicide.
2
See Martinez, supra note 1.
3
See Schwartz, supra note 1.
4
See id.; see also Aaron Swartz, Request for Comments No. 3870,
‘application/rdf+xml’ Media Type Registration, INTERNET SOC’Y NETWORK WORKING
GRP. (Sept. 2004), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3870.
5
See Schwartz, supra note 1; Aaron Swartz Biography, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aaron-swartz (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
6
See Schwartz, supra note 1; RSS Creator Aaron Swartz Dead at 26, HARVARD
MAG., Jan. 14, 2013, http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/01/rss-creator-aaron-swartz-deadat-26.
7
Superseding Indictment of Aaron Swartz at 1, United States v. Swartz, No. 11-CR10260-NMG, 2012 WL 4341933 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Superseding
Indictment].
8
Sandra Guy, Aaron Swartz Was ‘Killed by Government,’ Father Says at Funeral,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, www.suntimes.com/business/17594002-420/aaronswartz-memorialized-at-service.html.
9
Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 1.
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Stinebrickner-Kauffman alleged that the prosecutors had engaged
in “malfeasance.”10
Swartz’s supporters further criticized the prosecution.
Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School described the case
against Swartz as a failure of the legal system.11 Other academics
made similar accusations.12 Swartz received posthumous awards
from the American Library Association and the Internet Society.13
Some fans took more dramatic action, targeting the prosecutors
and MIT with hate mail, cyber attacks, and a hoax report of a
shooting on the MIT campus.14
Swartz’s defense attorneys, Elliot R. Peters and Daniel Purcell,
wrote a letter to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) at
the Massachusetts USAO, accusing Swartz’s prosecutors of
Peters and Purcell alleged that
professional misconduct.15
prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose
information concerning the amount of time the government took to
10

Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman, MIT Memorial Service, TARENSK (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://tarensk.tumblr.com/post/45281114505/mit-memorial-service.
11
See Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz—And Us, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 14, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyoneinteresting-is-a-felon.html.
12
See, e.g., David Amsden, The Brilliant Life and Tragic Death of Aaron Swartz,
ROLLING STONE, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-brilliantlife-and-tragic-death-of-aaron-swartz-20130215 (“[T]he federal government had . . . been
unrelenting in its quest to ensure that his punishment would be severe.”); Transcript:
Lawrence Lessig on “Aaron’s Laws—Law and Justice in a Digital Age,” CORRENTEWIRE
(Mar. 1, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.correntewire.com/transcript_lawrence_lessig_on_
aarons_laws_law_and_justice_in_a_digital_age [hereinafter Lessig on Aaron’s Laws]
(“Now, you don’t need to believe that Aaron was right to see why what the government
did here was wrong.”).
13
See Keith Michael Fiels, A Memorial Resolution Honoring Aaron Swartz, 2013 ALA
MEMORIAL #5 (2013); Inductees, Internet Hall of Fame Innovator Aaron Swartz,
Posthumous Recipient, THE INTERNET SOCIETY (2013), available at http://internethallof
fame.org/inductees/aaron-swartz.
14
See Derek J. Anderson, MIT Gunman Hoax Linked to Aaron Swartz’s Suicide,
According to Top School Official, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.boston
.com/metrodesk/2013/02/27/mit-gunman-hoax-linked-aaron-swartz-suicide-accordingtop-school-official/YvOMMxJ81eAbhrz4dTfErN/story.html.
15
Letter from Elliot R. Peters and Daniel Purcell, Counsel for Aaron Swartz, to Robin
C. Ashton, Counsel, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2013)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Peters Letter].
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apply for a search warrant on one of Swartz’s laptops.16 They also
accused prosecutors of abusing their discretion by offering a plea
bargain of less than six months imprisonment, while charging
Swartz with crimes that would likely carry seven years in prison if
he were convicted.17
I. BLAMING THE CFAA
In addition to blaming the Massachusetts USAO, Swartz’s
supporters also criticized the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA)18—the law articulating the computer crimes with which
Swartz was charged.19 Critics referred to the law as overbroad,
vague, redundant, and an antiquated relic of the 1980s.20 In
response to Swartz’s suicide, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren and
Senator Ron Wyden proposed “Aaron’s Law,” a bill intended to
amend and reform the CFAA.21
The angry accusations that Swartz’s family, friends, and
supporters made are completely understandable given the terrible
nature of their loss. However, few of these accusations reflect the
reality of Swartz’s case, intellectual property law, the CFAA, or
the interests these laws protect. Although United States v. Swartz22
provides prosecutors, defense attorneys, and intellectual property
lawyers with some important lessons, it was not an unethical
application of an unjust law.
The tragedy of Aaron Swartz’s death should instead remind all
attorneys in the criminal justice system of the serious, damaging
effects that a criminal prosecution can have on a defendant’s
mental health. It should inspire prosecutors and defense attorneys
alike to consider these health effects with great sensitivity, and
16

Id. at 1–6.
Id. at 6.
18
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
19
See Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, a Desperately Needed
Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (June 20, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here.
20
Id.
21
See Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013).
22
945 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D. Mass. 2013).
17
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reach out when necessary to the resources that can alleviate the
consequences of depression and related illness. Unfortunately,
these lessons, if they have been learned at all, have been
overshadowed by other reactions to Swartz’s death. In the year
since Swartz’s suicide, there has been a regrettable lack of
initiatives that might prevent the recurrence of such a terrible loss.
II. ARGUMENT/RESOLUTION: THE WRONG LESSONS
Critics of the Swartz prosecution often overlook three
important aspects of the case.23 The first is that Swartz caused real
damage to information systems and risked seriously harming
interests that deserve protection under the Constitution and as a
matter of public policy.24 The second is that the CFAA, despite its
obvious flaws, was well-suited to prevent the serious harm Swartz
almost succeeded in committing.25 Finally, although neither MIT
nor JSTOR actively participated in or encouraged the Swartz
prosecution, nothing about their actions or inactions indicates that
the prosecution itself was unjust.26
A. Swartz’s Harm
Some critics of the prosecution claimed, after his suicide, that
Swartz’s actions did not deserve punishment because he had not
caused any harm. For example, Columbia Law Professor Tim Wu,
writing the day before Swartz’s funeral, described Swartz’s actions
as follows:
The act was harmless—not in the sense of
hypothetical damages or the circular logic of
deterrence theory (that’s lawyerly logic), but in
John Stuart Mill’s sense, meaning that there was no
actual physical harm, nor actual economic harm.

23
24
25
26

See, e.g., Wu, supra note 11.
See infra notes 28–70.
See infra notes 72–132.
See infra notes 135–150.

1106

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:1101

The leak was found and plugged; JSTOR suffered
no actual economic loss.27
Wu and others were probably not aware at the time of the
funeral of exactly what Swartz had been charged with doing—
indeed, what Swartz had admitted doing. Any evaluation of the
prosecutors’ decisions ought to consider the extent of Swartz’s
actions against the MIT and JSTOR networks, the interests he
threatened, and his intent.
Swartz apparently conducted three distinct series of cyber
attacks28 at MIT during the fall and winter of 2010, when he
downloaded approximately 4.7 million copyright-protected
academic works.29 The word “apparently” instead of “allegedly” is
used because Swartz himself admitted his responsibility for these
downloads in his settlement with JSTOR.30 At the time of the
settlement negotiations, after Swartz’s arrest in 2011, JSTOR knew
that millions of its articles had been downloaded and was
desperately trying to ensure that these copyrighted works would
not be released to the public.31 Swartz sought to alleviate JSTOR’s
fears by handing over hard drives containing the downloaded
articles to the Massachusetts USAO, and by assuring JSTOR that
27
Wu, supra note 11; see also Amsden, supra note 12 (“In actuality, the downloads
were at the time something of an afterthought: an extension of Swartz’s fascination with
large data sets, his perpetual need to juggle multiple experiments at once.”).
28
“Cyber attack” is a term with various definitions. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
defines the term as “crimes in which the computer system is the target. Cyber attacks
consist of computer viruses (including worms and Trojan horses), denial of service
attacks, and electronic vandalism or sabotage.” Cybercrime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=41. The U.S.
National Research Council defines cyber-attacks as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt,
deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.” NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND
USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert
S. Lin eds., 2009). Swartz’s actions met both definitions.
29
See HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., TO THE PRESIDENT: MIT AND THE PROSECUTION OF
AARON SWARTZ 19–25 (2013) [hereinafter MIT REPORT], available at http://swartzreport.mit.edu/docs/report-to-the-president.pdf.
30
Press Release, JSTOR, Misuse Incident and Criminal Case (July 19, 2011)
[hereinafter JSTOR Press Release], available at http://about.jstor.org/news/jstorstatement-misuse-incident-and-criminal-case; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 41.
31
MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 41.
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no other copies existed, because he had downloaded all of the files
himself and kept them in his exclusive possession.32
Assuming that Swartz’s assurances to JSTOR were true, it was
he who conducted the first cyber attack on JSTOR on or about
September 25, 2010.33 He entered MIT’s campus, where he had
never been a student, faculty member, or employee,34 and
connected his computer to the Institute’s network.35 This first
action was unremarkable, because MIT at that time maintained an
open network that allowed any member of the public to enter the
campus, connect to the internet via the Institute’s provider, and
take advantage of the information resources, including JSTOR, for
which the Institute had contracted access.36 The extent of the
public’s access to resources like JSTOR was limited, in accordance
with contracts that MIT had signed with these content providers.37
Users could only access a limited number of articles for limited
uses—until Aaron Swartz disabled a safeguard in the network.38
Specifically, Swartz inserted a line of code, also known as a
“flag,” that modified the access protocol for JSTOR.39 The initial
access protocol had required that any user requesting to download
a JSTOR file from the MIT network would have to manually
confirm that user’s acceptance of JSTOR’s terms of use prior to
each download.40 Simply put, users had to click a box to indicate
their agreement prior to each download.41 JSTOR’s terms of
service prohibited users from automatically downloading articles

32

JSTOR Press Release, supra note 30; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 42.
JSTOR Press Release, supra note 30; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 42.
34
See Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 2; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 52
(The MIT Review Panel noted that, if Aaron Swartz had been formally associated with
MIT, the Institute might have been able to lobby against a federal criminal prosecution by
informing the USAO that it would handle the matter internally using the Institute’s
disciplinary system.).
35
See MIT REPORT supra note 29, at 52; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 4.
36
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 27.
37
See Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 4.
38
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16.
39
See id.
40
See id.
41
See id.
33
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in bulk.42 MIT’s terms of service explicitly notified users that
misuse of its network or those of content partners like JSTOR
could lead to state or federal prosecution.43 This “click”
requirement effectively notified users of the legal limits for
downloading and using JSTOR’s articles, and prevented those
users from quickly downloading a large number of articles.44
After neutralizing this safeguard, Swartz’s computer was able
to run a program that rapidly downloaded thousands of articles.45
Swartz downloaded so many articles so quickly that his requests
overloaded a server at JSTOR.46 When JSTOR’s engineers
realized what was going on, they stopped their server from
transferring files to the Internet Protocol (IP) address, or the
physical terminal at MIT, where Swartz had connected his
computer to the network.47 JSTOR also sent Swartz a message
indicating that his downloads exceeded JSTOR’s terms of use.48
Undeterred, Swartz switched to a different IP address and
continued downloading files.49 Over eleven hours, he managed to

42

Terms and Conditions of Use, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies
/terms.jsp (last visited Apr. 18, 2014); see also Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at
2.
43
MITnet Rules of Use, MIT, http://ist.mit.edu/network/rules (last visited Apr. 18,
2014); see also Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 2.
44
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16 n.2.
45
See id. at 16; JSTOR Evidence in United States vs. Aaron Swartz, Summary of
Events, JSTOR (July 30, 2013), http://docs.jstor.org/summary.html [hereinafter JSTOR
Summary].
46
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted
recipient] (Sept. 26, 2010, 11:01 AM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00028_0926-2010.PDF (“We are going to block them at the network level this is too much activity
for the system.”).
47
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted
recipient] (Sept. 25, 2010 8:59 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00003_09-252010.PDF (“[I.P. address] 18.55.6.215 is toast.”).
48
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted
recipient] (Sept. 25, 2010 10:04 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00022_0925-2010.PDF (“[T]he bad guys aren’t getting PDFs anymore. Just ‘go away’ messages.”).
49
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 5;
Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted recipient] (Sept. 26, 2010, 1:16 PM), available
at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00032_09-26-2010.PDF (“Unfortunately, it didn’t take long
for them to switch to another address this time.”).
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download 450,000 JSTOR articles from 560 academic journals.50
JSTOR only managed to stop him by denying access to the entire
Class C network,51 which consisted of all of the IP addresses in the
building where Swartz had connected his computer.52
Apparently to hide his identity, Swartz had modified his
laptop’s media access client (MAC) address to read “ghost laptop,”
and registered for access to the MIT network under the false name
“Gary Host,” which prevented MIT from determining who had
hacked their system.53 However, MIT’s department of Information
Systems and Technology (IS&T) was able to determine that the
laptop was not registered to an MIT student, faculty member, or
employee.54 JSTOR’s service remained disabled at the building
Swartz used until MIT’s librarians assured JSTOR that the
offending user had apparently been a guest of the Institute and was
unlikely to return.55
Less than two weeks later, Swartz connected to the MIT
network again and used a new technique to robotically harvest
JSTOR’s files.56
After downloading each article, Swartz’s
computer, which also had a disguised user name and MAC
address, was now programmed to rapidly download an article,
delete the “cookie” (record of Swartz’s connection to JSTOR),
disconnect from JSTOR, and then reconnect to download another
article.57 Swartz also made it appear to JSTOR as if thousands of
50

See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16.
“Class C addresses,” IBM.COM, available at http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/
infocenter/aix/v6r1/index.jsp?topic=%2Fcom.ibm.aix.commadmn%2Fdoc%2Fcommadm
ndita%2Faddresses_classc.htm (describing a Class C network as being large enough to
support 256 local host addresses).
52
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted
recipient] (Sept. 26, 2010, 5:58 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00033_0926-2010.PDF (“[A]dded the class c net below to the block and we’ve been in the clear for
two hours now.”).
53
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18 n.8; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at
4.
54
See Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 6.
55
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted
recipient] (Sept. 29, 2010, 4:03 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00038_0929-2010.PDF.
56
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45.
57
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18 n.9.
51
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computers across MIT’s campus were rapidly downloading
articles.58 These rapid downloads caused a “cascade of failures
that brought down multiple JSTOR servers. Half the servers in one
data center failed, and JSTOR engineers feared that the entire
service might go down worldwide.”59 To stop the attack, the nonprofit’s engineers shut down JSTOR access to every IP address on
MIT’s campus—an unprecedented step for JSTOR’s security
team.60 Thanks to JSTOR’s prompt action, Swartz was only able
to download about 8,000 articles.61 Meanwhile, no one on the
Institute’s campus was able to access JSTOR for three days, and
the Director of the MIT Libraries had to inform the Institute’s
leaders that the reason for the shut down was “a cyber-attack of the
JSTOR database.”62
A few weeks afterward, in late November, Swartz entered MIT
once again and went into an academic building in the center of the
campus.63 This time he went into the basement and opened a
closet containing the building’s network switches.64 The locking
mechanism on the closet was later found to be broken.65 Swartz
used a cable to connect his own laptop to the Institute’s network
using one of these network switches, and hid the laptop under a
cardboard box on the floor.66 By connecting to a network switch
in the basement, instead of a computer terminal elsewhere in the
building, Swartz managed to use MIT’s internet connection

58

See id. at 18.
Id.; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted recipient] (Oct. 9, 2010, 6:14 PM),
available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00052_10-09-2010.PDF (“About half the servers
in [redacted] are now broken.”).
60
See MIT Report, supra note 29, at 18; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted
recipient] (Oct. 9, 2010, 10:31 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00054_10-092010.PDF.
61
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18.
62
See id.
63
See id. at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 8.
64
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at
8.
65
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at
8.
66
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at
8.
59
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without registering as a user at all.67 He could therefore use MIT’s
network to access the internet (and JSTOR) without any
supervision by MIT’s information technology administrators.68
His computer remained there for at least a month, during which
time he employed a new series of hacks to download
approximately 4.3 million articles from JSTOR without
detection.69 In the aftermath of this attack, MIT implemented a
new access protocol, which prevented any of the Institute’s visitors
from accessing JSTOR, except from certain monitored computers
in the MIT libraries.70
B. The Interests Swartz Threatened, and How the CFAA Defends
Them
In his article for The New Yorker, Professor Wu wrote, “Like a
pie in the face, Swartz’s act was annoying to its victim, but of no
lasting consequence.”71 JSTOR’s actions and statements at the
time of the attacks contradict this assertion. In September 2010,
JSTOR shut down access to one of MIT’s buildings in response to
the 450,000-article theft.72 At that time, JSTOR notified MIT that
Swartz’s activity “clearly indicat[ed] robotic harvesting of PDFs
[articles] which violates our Terms & Conditions of Use.”73 In
October, JSTOR denied its service to MIT’s entire campus in
response to the multiple server crash that occurred during the
8,000-article theft.74 JSTOR informed MIT that the downloaded
articles were “not limited to a specific discipline, but were
sequential across JSTOR’s entire database [which indicated] ‘a
concerted effort [was] being made to download the entirety of the
JSTOR archive.”75 Finally, when it detected the 4.3 million67

See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at

4.
68

See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at

4.
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25, 41; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45.
MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 27.
Wu, supra note 11.
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45.
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45.
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45.
See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45.
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download attack in December, which brought Swartz’s overall
theft to approximately eighty percent of JSTOR’s entire archive,
the non-profit requested that MIT make “every effort . . . to
identify the individuals responsible and to ensure that the content
taken in this incident and those previously mentioned is secured
and deleted.”76 JSTOR described Swartz’s downloads as “extreme
unauthorized activity . . . malicious and intentional.”77
JSTOR’s interest in preventing the release of the articles with
which it was entrusted might seem self-explanatory. However, the
repeated assertions, by critics of the prosecution, that Swartz’s
actions involved “no harm” indicate a need to emphasize the
interests at stake. The articles in JSTOR’s archive are the
intellectual property of their authors and publishers.78 JSTOR
itself is a non-profit institution.79 It makes digital copies of articles
from thousands of academic journals, and provides those articles in
a catalogued, searchable format to subscribers, mostly academic
institutions, for a fee.80 Some institutions receive free or
discounted access.81 Schools pay for access to JSTOR’s digital
copies of articles so that they do not have to acquire, store, or
digitize documents themselves.82
As an ethical matter, this means that the information in its
archive is not JSTOR’s product. JSTOR does not produce
anything.
Instead, JSTOR provides a service: digitizing
information and providing a searchable, accessible source for those
seeking access to it. JSTOR provides this service, in its words, to
“[support] scholarly work and access to knowledge around the
world.”83 The non-profit pays content providers for access to their
76
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intellectual property, and makes these valuable documents
available to “[f]aculty, teachers, and students at more than 7,000
institutions in 153 countries.”84 JSTOR’s leaders emphasized in
the non-profit’s press release that as “responsible stewards” of
their content providers’ works, it is their responsibility to prevent
unauthorized use.85
It ought to be self-evident that if all of JSTOR’s articles were
released online, the non-profit could no longer provide its service.
That is probably what Aaron Swartz was trying to accomplish. In
2008, Swartz published86 a document entitled, “Guerilla Open
Access Manifesto,” in which he stated that those with access to
information databases have a moral duty to break copyright laws
by “trading passwords with colleagues” and “filling download
requests for friends.”87 He praised those who “have been sneaking
through holes and climbing over fences, liberating the information
locked up by the publishers . . . .”88 Swartz criticized the notion
that such activity is “stealing or piracy, as if sharing a wealth of
knowledge were the moral equivalent of plundering a ship and
murdering its crew.”89 He described the copyright laws, which
prevent these actions, as “unjust” and backed by politicians who
have been “bought off” by corporations who in turn are “blinded
by greed.”90 He declared that the time had come to engage in
“civil disobedience” against the copyright laws.
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We need to take information, wherever it is stored,
make our copies and share them with the world . . .
We need to buy secret databases and put them on
the Web. We need to download scientific journals
and upload them to file sharing networks. We need
to fight for Guerilla Open Access. With enough of
us, around the world, we’ll not just send a strong
message opposing the privatization of knowledge—
we’ll make it a thing of the past.91
In 2008, Swartz took advantage of a trial period during which
the United States courts temporarily allowed free access to the
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) archive,
which contains documents filed in federal courts.92 Normally
PACER charges users a small fee per page, which finances the
collection, scanning, and uploading of records to the PACER
archive, as well as PACER’s catalogue and search functions.93 In
2008, however, the federal courts made PACER available for free
to public libraries.94 Swartz took this opportunity to write a
program that began downloading all of the documents in the
PACER archive.95 Doing so, he managed to acquire almost 20
million pages of records, or twenty percent of PACER’s
documents, before the courts shut down the libraries’ free access in
order to stop the bulk downloads.96 Swartz donated all of these
records
to
an
open
government
initiative
called
public.resource.org.97 Since the court documents were in the
public domain and not protected by copyright, the government
determined that Swartz had not broken any law.98
One Swartz supporter, whom the MIT Review Panel decided to
identify publicly as only “a leader in the global movement for open
91
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access to scientific publications,” wrote an email to the President
of MIT, which indicated that Swartz intended to release JSTOR’s
documents to the public, just as he had done with the PACER
documents.99 In an apparent attempt to excuse Swartz’s actions,
the leader, who confessed a limited knowledge of the American
justice system, told MIT’s President that: “Aaron Swartz had
attended a meeting that included a discussion of how much it
would cost to get JSTOR to open up its archive for the public and
how that exceeded the funds available to the group at the
meeting.”100 The leader also wrote of his fear that their
conversation at that meeting played a role in Aaron Swartz’s
unfortunate decision to conduct the hack.101
Other friends and supporters of Swartz suggested that he might
not have actually intended to release the JSTOR archive to the
public. Carl Malamud, the open-government advocate to whom
Swartz had donated the PACER documents, wrote that he did not
think Swartz would release the downloaded documents “without a
great deal of post-download analysis.”102 At least one supporter
has suggested that Swartz might have downloaded JSTOR’s
articles only to collect data about the articles, that is, to determine
the influence of “big money” in scientific research, or how many
publicly funded scientific studies were being sold or licensed for
fees by their authors and publishers.103 Swartz had previously
assisted a law student in conducting a similar study of law journal
articles.104 JSTOR, however, pointed out that it has made data
about its articles and their funding available to the public since
2008 for exactly this purpose, and that it actively participates in
data-driven studies of its publications:
99
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[W]e support and encourage the legitimate use of
large sets of content from JSTOR for research
purposes. We regularly provide scholars with
access to content for this purpose. Our Data for
Research site (http://dfr.jstor.org) was established
expressly to support text mining and other projects,
and our Advanced Technologies Group is an eager
collaborator with researchers in the academic
community.105
Swartz would not have needed to attack MIT’s and JSTOR’s
network to get the kind of information he acquired for the legal
journal study.
It is hard to argue that Aaron Swartz had an innocent reason for
disabling MIT’s network security protocols and connecting a
computer hidden in a basement to the Institute’s network switch. It
is even harder to make that argument when one notes how close he
came to downloading the entirety of the JSTOR archive.106
Swartz’s actions, in fact, fall squarely within the purview of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which clearly prohibits
modifying a computer network in order to exceed authorized
use.107 Swartz repeatedly modified MIT’s network security
protocols, and used the network without authorization by plugging
directly into the network switch.108 He did so in order to defeat the
safeguards that would have prevented him from downloading
millions of articles, which he probably intended to share freely
with the rest of the world.109 The potential consequences of his
goal ought to be readily apparent from the actual consequences.
Whenever Aaron Swartz began robotically harvesting files from a
document provider, be it PACER or JSTOR, that provider shut
down its service in order to safeguard its ability to operate.110 This
105
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illustrates the divergence between what he claimed he was doing
and what he was actually doing: instead of making all information
free to the public, he was making it impossible to distribute any
information to the public in a sustainable way.
When Swartz attempted to robotically harvest the entire
PACER archive on behalf of public.resource.org, Carl Malamud
envisioned that his organization might place all of the courts’
documents on an “independent server, one that would offer the
same material but be better organized, easier to search and free,
anytime and anywhere.”111 No such archive exists, not least
because neither Malamud nor Swartz had the employees or
infrastructure to do what PACER and JSTOR do.
The services that Swartz attacked do not create or even own
content—they distribute content to the public.112 That distribution
involves collecting, scanning, digitizing, cataloguing, and
preparing millions of articles to be searched, accessed, and
downloaded.113 Those processes cannot happen without time,
effort, and money. PACER and JSTOR found a way to collect
money—not to make a profit, but to enable the processes that
distribute content. Aaron Swartz almost stopped them.
Critics of the CFAA have argued that the law, which was
originally passed in 1986, does not reflect the reality of modern
computer usage.114 The most common concern is the law’s
language prohibiting any use of a computer that “exceeds
authorized access.”115 This has raised fears about the law’s scope,
and whether it might criminalize minor or trivial violations of
software terms of use, which most computer users disregard
without reading.116 Scholars have suggested that it might even be
construed to criminalize as felons those employees who use their
111
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work computers to “frolic” on the Internet.117 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in
2011 when it affirmed a district court ruling dismissing a CFAA
charge in United States v. Nosal.118
Professor Wu cited the Ninth Circuit’s Nosal decision when he
wrote that the government’s “legal authority” in the Swartz case
was “shaky.”119 Even if Nosal were binding precedent in the
District of Massachusetts—which it is not—the case is
distinguishable from Swartz. Nosal involved a defendant who
conspired with employees of an executive-recruiting company to
steal files from the company.120 At the defendant’s urging, those
employees accessed their company’s network in a normal,
authorized manner, but did so in order to improperly transfer
confidential files to the defendant.121 Chief Judge Kozinski,
writing for the majority, affirmed the dismissal of the CFAArelated counts of the Nosal indictment, holding that the CFAA
cannot apply to “everyone who uses a computer in violation of
computer use restrictions,” because such an application “may well
Nosal is
include everyone who uses a computer.”122
distinguishable from Swartz for several reasons, not least because
the former did not involve anything that could be characterized as
a cyber attack.123 Unlike Aaron Swartz, none of the employees
modified or defeated their company’s network security
protocols.124 They did not disable a network’s safeguards, nor did
they surreptitiously seize control of someone else’s computer
network in order to use that network in a manner for which it was
not intended.125 Most obviously, they did not create dummy
accounts, connect unauthorized computers to network switches
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
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hidden in closets, or crash servers.126 They did not attack their
company’s network. They just stole files from work—a theft that
the Court of Appeals acknowledged was a chargeable crime under
other laws.127
The CFAA has its faults, including vague language that could
expose a network user to a severe penalty for minor violations if
courts or prosecutors interpret the law too broadly. However,
when Swartz disabled network security protocols and trespassed on
MIT property to connect his computer to their network switch, he
was not like any employee who “frolics” on the internet at work.
He used MIT’s and JSTOR’s computers against the will of both
non-profit entities, despite the objections of both, and repeatedly
overpowered their efforts to resist his penetration and control of
their systems. This was not analogous to using a nickname on
Facebook. He damaged information systems in order to steal
millions of copyrighted works. No revision of the CFAA would
excuse this conduct. The United States Constitution itself requires
the federal government to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”128 Aaron Swartz quite self-consciously attempted to
deprive content producers of that exclusive right.
If he had accepted the government’s guilty plea offer, and
served a few months in prison, it stands to reason that Swartz
would have emerged with an even greater reputation as a fighter
for open access. Perhaps he would have used his notoriety to
advocate for the amendment of the CFAA, so that defendants
charged with relatively minor computer crimes—crimes more
minor than his own—would not face the possibility of years in
prison. Instead, it was his death that inspired the bill known as
“Aaron’s Law” to amend the CFAA.129 As of this writing, the bill
is before the House Committee on the Judiciary.130 If it passes,
126
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Aaron’s Law would strike the potentially problematic language,
“exceeds authorized access” from the CFAA, and clarify that the
crime of “access without authorization” means an act:
(A) to obtain information on a protected computer;
(B) that the accesser lacks authorization to obtain;
and
(C) by knowingly circumventing one or more
technological or physical measures that are
designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized
individuals from obtaining that information.131
In their press release announcing the bill, Aaron’s Law drafters
Representative Zoe Lofgren and Senator Ron Wyden were careful
not to claim that such revisions to the CFAA would prevent
prosecution of acts like Swartz’s sustained attacks on MIT and
JSTOR.132 Swartz, of course, circumvented, manipulated, and
disabled a number of physical and technological safeguards in
order to obtain copyrighted intellectual property against JSTOR’s
and MIT’s expressed objections and despite their concerted efforts
to stop him.133 Aaron’s Law would not legalize such activity.
C. Neither MIT’s Neutrality Nor JSTOR’s Later Opposition
Rendered Prosecution Unjust
Several critics of the prosecution have pointed out that JSTOR
and MIT, the alleged victims of Swartz’s crimes, declined to press
charges against him.134 Such criticism overlooks the vigor with
which JSTOR asserted and defended its own intellectual property
rights, resisted his attacks on its network, demanded that he be
identified and stopped, and condemned his actions until the
moment JSTOR received its property back along with assurances
that he would no longer harm JSTOR’s interests.135 It also
overlooks the possibility that the threat of a criminal penalty
131
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allowed JSTOR to demand the return of its property from Swartz,
or, conversely, that Swartz withheld JSTOR’s property until his
lawyers extracted from the non-profit a promise that it would not
seek his prosecution.136
All of this runs counter to the idea that JSTOR actually
believed Aaron Swartz had done nothing wrong. Indeed, JSTOR’s
increasingly agitated complaints throughout the months of
Swartz’s cyber attacks belie the notion. In September 2010,
JSTOR asserted that Swartz’s first attacks “clearly” violated its
terms of use.137 A JSTOR administrator described the attack as an
“extreme case,” using a download pattern that was “terribly
efficient, but not terribly subtle,” and necessitating the largest
service blockage (denying service to entire Class C range) that the
administrator had ever seen in his tenure.138
In October 2010, JSTOR concluded that the server-crashing
attacks were a “concerted effort” to download its entire archive.139
In December 2010, JSTOR described the multi-million-download
attacks as “malicious and intentional.”140
Another JSTOR
administrator suggested on December 26 that if JSTOR and MIT
could not stop the attacks, they might have to call the FBI.141 In
June of 2011, when JSTOR informed MIT that Swartz had handed
over the downloaded files to the Boston USAO, it described the
files as “stolen records.”142
As for MIT, the Institute maintained a stance of “neutrality”
throughout the prosecution, and even after Swartz’s death
reiterated its compelling reasons for not opposing the prosecution:
Aaron Swartz had used MIT’s premises and
network to allegedly commit crimes, he had
adversely affected MIT’s relationship with JSTOR,
136
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and he had seriously inconvenienced MIT’s
Libraries, MIT researchers, and students seeking to
use JSTOR, and MIT’s IS&T personnel who
repeatedly tried to stop his misuse of MIT’s
network. MIT felt no sense of obligation toward
someone who had abused the open access privileges
it had provided for the convenience of guests, even
if that abuse was carried out in the name of open
access.143
MIT’s Review Panel further observed that opposing the
prosecution might indicate to the public that the Institute was not
serious about contracts with licensors or the integrity of its
network.144
But setting all of that aside for a moment, and assuming
arguendo that JSTOR or MIT had expressed a completely genuine
desire that Swartz not be punished, such a desire would not
necessarily compel the government to drop the charges. In the first
place, these parties’ supposed absolution could not encompass the
feelings of every single academic, author, and publisher who
entrusted them with their intellectual property. Indeed, neither
JSTOR nor MIT are the owners or publishers of the intellectual
property that Swartz stole.145 Furthermore, when authorities
encounter remarkably forgiving-crime victims, these victims’
desire to turn the other cheek, and who conscientiously object to
the imposition of criminal penalties, does not stand in the way of
the government enforcing its laws.146 In the case of intellectual
property, prosecutors have a clear constitutional and statutory duty
to prevent theft.147
AUSA Heymann, the lead prosecutor, indicated to MIT’s
Office of General Counsel that he had considered JSTOR’s and
143
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MIT’s positions on the matter.148 However, he also indicated that
he had to consider deterring others from committing similar
crimes.149 Swartz seemed to be making a bold stand, the kind of
civil disobedience that could certainly impress anyone who
opposes intellectual property per se. That stand was also
audacious for a very serious reason: he had poked the United
States government in the eye, deliberately undermining the
intellectual property rights that the government is constitutionally
bound to defend.150
It is possible, however, that Swartz was completely unaware of
the seriousness of his actions until after his arrest. When MIT
Police accosted Swartz after catching him on camera changing the
hard drive on the basement computer, Swartz responded that he
“didn’t speak with strangers.”151 He then stated that MIT Police
are not “real cops,” and fled.152 Shortly thereafter, two MIT Police
officers and a United States Secret Service agent apprehended
Swartz.153 His friend Quinn Norton and attorney Elliott Peters
both told the MIT Review Panel that Swartz was “shocked” by his
arrest.154 Norton said Swartz “didn’t regard what he had done as a
big deal and was surprised that people were making so much of
it.”155
Such a perspective would be remarkably obtuse, especially for
the man who wrote with such passion about the forces arrayed
against him in the worldwide battle for open access.156 Regardless
of whether Swartz understood the magnitude of his actions, the
fact remained that almost five million copyrighted works, which
derived their monetary value from the limits on their distribution,
148
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had come within a few keystrokes of being lost. A non-profit that
funds research and makes information available across the world
was almost put out of business. This was all in addition to the
JSTOR servers that crashed under the weight of Swartz’s attacks,
the efforts of JSTOR and MIT employees to identify and repel his
attacks, and the days that MIT’s students and faculty went without
access to JSTOR’s resources in the aftermath of those attacks. If
there was anything that could reasonably prevent the government
from seeking imprisonment for Aaron Swartz, JSTOR’s supposed
absolution was not it.
CONCLUSION: MISSED SIGNALS
The United States has a long and cherished history of civil
disobedience, of true believers who openly challenge the status
quo. To some, Aaron Swartz was such a freedom fighter:
In another time, a man with Swartz’s dark drive
would have headed to the frontier. Perhaps he
would have ventured out into the wilderness, like T.
E. Lawrence or John Muir . . . . Swartz possessed a
self-destructive drive toward actions that felt right
to him, but that were also defiant and, potentially,
law-breaking. Like Henry David Thoreau, he
chased his own dreams, and he was willing to
disobey laws he considered unjust.157
One might say the same of Jeremy Hammond, a hacker who
pled guilty in 2013 to attacking the networks of corporations,
government agencies, and law enforcement advocacy groups.158
At his sentencing in the Southern District of New York, Hammond
described his attacks as “acts of civil disobedience” against
government surveillance and corporate complicity.159 After he was
157
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sentenced to 10 years in prison, he raised a fist in the air and
yelled, “Long live Anonymous!” and “Hurrah for anarchy!” while
being escorted from the courtroom.160 To some observers, Aaron
Swartz might have seemed like another Jeremy Hammond, but the
evidence indicates that Swartz was a very different young man. At
least one commentator has suggested that Swartz rejected the
Government’s offers of minimal sentence guidelines during plea
negotiations because he could not bear the thought of being a
felon.161
There was another, more serious problem. Six years before his
suicide, friends and readers posted the following messages on
Swartz’s blog in response to a short story he had published:
“Hey Aaron, You’re scaring me here. Please s[t]ick
around and talk to us. You can always die later.
There’s no rush.”
“Jeez, Aaron—get some help. Now. Suicides talk
about it before they do it.”
“Aaron, you’re scaring me. You’re one of the most
brilliant people around and you have a bright
future.”
“Hey Aaron—I’m a little worried here. Please heed
the above advice. Let me know if I can help.”162
The short story that inspired these messages, “A Moment
Before Dying,” describes a young man and his struggles with
depression shortly before he commits suicide.163 Swartz’s friends
took the post so seriously—the title character in the original
version was named “Aaron”—that one of them called the police.164
Swartz also blogged explicitly about his own struggles with
depression, quoting writer George Scialabba to describe his
condition:
160
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[A]cute depression does not feel like falling ill, it
feels like being tortured . . . the pain is not
localized; it runs along every nerve, an
unconsuming fire . . . . Even though one knows
better, one cannot believe that it will ever end, or
that anyone else has ever felt anything like it.165
Other posts in the blog reveal Swartz to be a sensitive,
thoughtful, brilliant young man who reveled in discussing a diverse
variety of topics, from economic theory to popular films. Frequent
themes in the blog included individuals who challenge the status
quo and the death of such individuals, including by suicide. These
themes appeared in Swartz’s last three blog posts, the first of
which he published on September 25, 2012.
This third-to-last post was a mostly academic discussion of
labor relations and productivity in the automotive industry, and
specifically considered how managers might motivate their
workers to follow instruction.166 After a detailed historical and
philosophical discussion of organizational theory and the effects of
economic incentives, Swartz concluded the post with the
following:
When you’re upset with someone, all you want to
do is change the way they’re acting. But you can’t
control what’s inside a person’s head. Yelling at
them isn’t going to make them come around, it’s
just going to make them more defiant . . . . No, you
can’t force other people to change. You can,
however, change just about everything else. And
usually, that’s enough.167
Perhaps this offers a glimpse into the mind of a man who
turned down a zero-to-six months sentence, after admitting to the
charged conduct and knowing that he would likely spend seven
years in prison if he went to trial.
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Any evaluation of the decisions preceding Aaron Swartz’s
death bears the inevitable tinge of hindsight. As the MIT Report
put it, “[H]ow does one maintain a perspective uncolored by the
shock and tragedy of Aaron Swartz’s suicide[?]”168 It would not
be fair to blame anyone for failing to realize the seriousness of
Swartz’s condition. His partner, Stinebrickner-Kauffman, said, “I
don’t think any of us actually realized how much of a toll it had
taken, until later, until after he died. He hid it from us well.”169
Nevertheless, Swartz’s attorneys were apparently concerned
about his mental health. Andy Good, the first lawyer who
represented Swartz in the prosecution, told the Boston Globe, “I
told Heymann [that Swartz] was a suicide risk . . . . [Heymann’s]
reaction was a standard reaction in that office, not unique to Steve.
He said, ‘Fine, we’ll lock him up.’ . . . [T]hey were aware of the
risk, and they were heedless.”170 At least one Swartz supporter
raised the issue with MIT’s President.171 The aforementioned
“leader in the global movement for open access to scientific
publications,” wrote that a term in prison would be “fateful,
unbearable, in the worst case, deadly” for Swartz.172
If it were indeed the case that any prosecutor reacted callously
or flippantly to a warning that Aaron Swartz’s life was in danger,
such a reaction would certainly be the subject of bitter regret. The
Central District of California has recently implemented a program
to allow prosecutors and others to take steps to mitigate a mentally
ill defendant’s risk to himself and others.173 The District Court,
working together with the federal defender’s office and a mental
health provider, crafted a resource program that helps defendants
manage their symptoms of anxiety, depression, and suicidal
168
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thoughts, all while protecting their right against selfincrimination.174 The program includes crisis intervention, support
groups, instruction on healthy coping skills, cognitive behavioral
therapy, and lessons on keys to successful incarceration.175
Similar options are also available to defense attorneys. In fact,
the Boston Bar Association hosted an event in November 2013
entitled “Recognizing and Responding to Suicidal Persons: What
Lawyers Need to Know.”176 The event included a panel discussion
by defense attorneys, prosecutors, and mental health professionals,
and the event program provided a directory of mental health
resources and advice for attorneys.177 Given that prosecutors
might naturally question a defense attorney’s suggestion that his
client should not be punished for health reasons, it is even more
important that defense attorneys be proactive in monitoring and
safeguarding a defendant’s mental health, especially when the
defendant is not under government confinement.
If nothing else, Aaron Swartz’s story is a cause for reflection
for all who exercise power over people, machines, or networks.
Swartz was born with astounding intellectual gifts, which he
developed at a young age into a remarkable power to manipulate
networked systems. He wielded his power irresponsibly, and in
doing so, he made himself the target of a government whose power
is unmatched in history. It appears that Aaron Swartz found, quite
reasonably, that it is extremely stressful to confront such a power.
The prosecutors in the Massachusetts USAO, who exercise
power on behalf of the government, have certainly been unjustly
accused of many things in the wake of Swartz’s death. However, a
sense of perspective is important here. As awful as it must be for
any public servant to face false or unfair accusations in public, how
much worse must it have been for that young man, alone in his
Brooklyn apartment, confronting the awesome power of the
174

See id. at 42.
See id.
176
Recognizing and Responding to Suicidal Persons: What Lawyers Need to Know,
BOSTON BAR ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2013), available at https://www.bostonbar
.org/membership/events/event-details?ID=14274.
177
Id.
175

2014]

FAITH AND MARTYRDOM

1129

government by himself? There can be little doubt that, misguided
as he was, he never stopped wanting to make the world a better
place.
The epigraph to this Note is from Oscar Wilde’s novel about a
young man who kills himself in a desperate attempt to draw
support for his own discredited scholarly theory.178 In the quoted
passage, the narrator is addressing a man named Erskine, a friend
of the deceased, who refuses to publish the dead man’s theory due
to its lack of literary support.179 Appalled, the narrator pleads with
Erskine to publish the theory, saying, “[A]nd if you will not tell of
his martyrdom, tell at least of his faith.”180 Erskine is adamant that
the young man’s suicide lends no credence to his theory: “a thing
is not necessarily true because a man dies for it.”181
Aaron Swartz’s suicide does not reflect the justice or injustice
of the CFAA, but Swartz’s theories about the importance of access
to scholarship will live on regardless of whether the government
acted justly in attempting to punish him.182 His ideas will endure
because in Swartz’s short but exceptional life he earned the love
and admiration of relatives, friends, and supporters around the
world.183 Those supporters have spoken and written much about
what they regard as his martyrdom184 and they may understandably
resent this Note’s assertion that Swartz was not the victim of the
injustices they have alleged. It is therefore appropriate to give the
last word to Swartz’s family, who wrote not just of his martyrdom,
but also of his faith:
Aaron’s insatiable curiosity, creativity, and
brilliance; his reflexive empathy and capacity for
selfless, boundless love; his refusal to accept
injustice as inevitable—these gifts made the world,
and our lives, far brighter. We’re grateful for our
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time with him, to those who loved him and stood
with him, and to all of those who continue his work
for a better world.185
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